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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Occasionally throughout history the world is introduced to a new technology 
that completely changes human life, such as the printing press, the Henry Ford 
assembly line, and the Internet.  The next wave in life-changing technology will 
be the three-dimensional (3D) printer, which will allow the consumer to print any 
item at home.  Not only will people be able to print any item they need via a 
digital download, but they will also have the power to design it themselves.  Since 
the more basic patents on the invention have expired, these printers will soon 
become a staple in the common household.  3D printers will soon be readily 
available, affordable and accessible, and everyday people will be printing whatever 
objects they desire. 
However, like all revolutions that affect major consumer industries, a 
revolution in the law must also follow, which traditionally tends to lag 
significantly behind technological advances.1 The next question inevitably will be 
how this technology fits into the current intellectual property framework, if at all.  
The entire act of 3D printing stretches across many facets of the law, as it involves 
a machine, a product, an underlying digital process, and often the translation of 
that process.  This Article will discuss which of these aspects of 3D printing fit 
under current patent and copyright laws and which aspects fall into gaps in the 
existing law.  The Article will further discuss viable solutions offered by scholars 
in the IP community and the policy implications of gaps in the law.  
A.  BASICS OF 3D PRINTING 
A 3D printer uses instructions, a blueprint or design software from a 
computer to create three-dimensional objects out of hardened powder, molten 
or liquid substances.  The materials are spread into a single-layered pattern via 
the 3D “print head.”  Once this first layer hardens, the print head produces 
another layer on top of the hardened layer.  The print head continues this exercise 
until the three-dimensional object is completed, which sometimes consists of 
hundreds of thin, individually-stacked layers.2  This process is referred to as 
“additive manufacturing.”3  Because the 3D printer uses a layering system to build 
the object, an object that has interlocking, separate parts can be printed already 
assembled, rather than having to manually compile all of the individual parts 
                                                                                                                   
 1  See Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 
2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-pace-with-
technology/. 
 2  HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, FABRICATED: THE NEW WORLD OF 3D PRINTING 12 
(2010). 
 3  Id.  
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separately.4  This would cut down on labor costs and time, as well as add to the 
convenience of utilizing these printers in multiple industries and fabrications.   
The blueprint sent to the computer to print the object is created using a 
computer-aided design (CAD) program.  Alternatively, a CAD may be created 
with a 3D scanner, which can scan any object and create a three-dimensional 
blueprint.5  This process results in easy replication of virtually any object. 
While initial 3D printer systems used a process of layering plastic materials, 
newer systems of printing may involve a variety of stronger materials.6  Selective 
laser sintering (SLS) involves releasing an initial aerosol cloud of building 
material, usually metals, which a laser then precisely fuses together in the shape 
of the object.7  Another process called selective laser melting (SLM) takes the 
process one step further by melting all the metal material before the building 
begins.  The printer then fuses together the tiny molten metal materials.  The SLS 
and SLM processes have both been used by NASA in rocket and launch design.8  
As has become increasingly apparent in recent decades, many common everyday 
objects were first utilized and further developed by NASA.  The 3D printer will 
not be an exception to this trend. 
The 3D scanners mentioned above are also becoming more widely available.  
This scanning technology, also known as photogrammetry, is developing rapidly.9  
These scanners collect data from an actual three-dimensional object to create a 
digital model to the exact specifications of the object.  Once the digital model is 
created, it can then be printed using a 3D printer, making the possibilities for 3D 
printed objects virtually limitless.10  Photogrammerty scanners, handheld 3D 
scanners, and attachable 3D scanners for the iPhone and iPad are either already 
available for purchase or in the works.11  This scanning technology has even been 
recognized as a highly valuable educational tool.  In fact, the Smithsonian is in 
the process of scanning artifacts, artworks, and specimens in its museums to 
make available to other museums and educators.  The program is called 
“Smithsonian X 3D,” and the institution has prioritized 10% of their 137-million-
piece collection for the creation of 3D digital models.12  As this example shows, 
                                                                                                                   
 4  Michael Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome If They Don’t Screw It Up: 3D Printing, Intellectual Property, 
and the Fight Over the Next Great Disruptive Technology, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE 2 (Nov. 2010), 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/3DPrintingPaperPublicKnowledge.pdf. 
 5  Id. at 3. 
 6  Graham Templeton, How does 3D printing work?, EXTREME TECH (Oct. 26, 2015), 
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/216652-how-does-3d-printing-work. 
 7  Id. 
 8  Id. 
 9  John Hornick & Carlos Rosario, 3D Scanning: The Achilles Heel of IP Protection for 3D Printing, 
3D PRINTING PROGRESS (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.3dprintingprogress.com/articles/8580/3d-
scanning-the-achilles-heel-of-ip-protection-for-3d-printing. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Id.  
 12  About Smithsonian X 3D, SMITHSONIAN X 3D, http://3d.si.edu/about (last visited Oct. 1, 
2017). 
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there are likely few industries or markets where 3D printing would not provide 
some substantial service, even in education.  Further, the Smithsonian’s 
confidence in 3D printing to provide near exact replicas of their priceless originals 
shows speaks volumes on the technology’s capabilities. 
B.  INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 
The goals and incentives of intellectual property are inextricably intertwined 
with the economic impact of technology.  Therefore, understanding 3D printing’s 
affects is important to adequately view it through an intellectual property 
perspective.  Though 3D printing is still in its early stages, the potential for the 
technology is astounding.  These printers can produce anything from household 
items and spare parts to even prosthetic limbs, plastic guns, and even small 
houses.  Websites such as Shapeways13 and Thingiverse14 provide a community 
for people to upload and download designs to print on personal 3D printers using 
a variety of materials such as metal, plastic, porcelain, and wax.  These websites 
offer downloads for items such as jewelry and home appliance parts.15  Shapeways 
even features the ability to scan oneself at select locations in the Netherlands to 
create a personal miniature figurine, or “3D Selfie.”16  Most notably, these 
printers can produce numerous human body tissues17 and even food.18  3D 
printers can even print 3D printers.19 
The eventual low cost of 3D printing combined with their ability to produce 
most physical things will fundamentally change the economics of industrial 
manufacturing.20  Much like the Internet, 3D printers separate the content of the 
product from the information used to create it, which, in turn, will substantially 
reduce the manufacturing costs.21  This feature will inevitably mean that the 
production of items can come from virtually anywhere which will certainly 
                                                                                                                   
 13  SHAPEWAYS, http://www.shapeways.com/ (last visited Oct. 1,2017). 
 14  THINGIVERSE, https://www.thingiverse.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2017). 
 15  SHAPEWAYS, 3D Printing Materials: Plastics, Metal, Ceramics and More, 
http://shapeways.com/materials (last visited Oct. 1, 2017). 
 16  Shapeways Now Offering 3D Selfies in the Netherlands, SHAPEWAYS (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.shapeways.com/presscorner/press-release/2015-09-28-shapeways-now-offering-3d-
selfies-in-the-netherlands.  
 17  Robert J. Szczerba, No Donor Required: 5 Body Parts You Can Make With 3-D Printers, FORBES 
(June 17, 2015, 7:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertszczerba/2015/06/17/no-donor-
required-5-body-parts-you-can-make-with-3-d-printers-2/#5391aefc7d55. 
 18  Jacopo Prisco, ‘Foodini’ Machine Lets You Print Edible Burgers, Pizza, Chocolate, CNN (Dec. 31, 
2014, 1:06 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/06/tech/innovation/foodini-machine-print-
food/. 
 19  Ben Rooney, The 3D Printer That Prints Itself, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2011, 1:20 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2011/06/10/the-3d-printer-that-prints-itself/. 
 20  Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 474–75 (2015).  
 21  Id. at 474. 
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present problems for governments and markets.22  The emergence of the “home-
based factory”23 may even change the enforcement and regulation of traditional 
employment laws governing earnings, hours, child-labor, workplace safety, and 
even unionization as the lines between work and home begin to blur.  In fact, 3D 
printing will touch almost every area of law in existence, including gun laws, 
products liability, importation, contracts, environmental law, and regulatory 
competition law, to name only a few.24  Obviously, intellectual property law is no 
exception and the approach to 3D printing in this area will be an important 
guidepost for judiciaries and practitioners when they analyze other areas at law.  
It is yet to be determined if this is for better or worse, as IP is often one of the 
most turbulent and evolving areas of the law. 
Digitization of a product has already once shaken the parameters of 
intellectual property, particularly for that of copyright law in the area of music. 
Music became a nonrivalrous good in the wake of music-sharing sites, such as 
the infamous Napster.  A nonrivalrous good is “like an idea: it need only be 
created once and has an infinite capacity in that once it is created there is no 
additional marginal cost in allowing others to use it.”25  It is widely accepted in 
our economy that a rivalrous good should be allocated to the person who values 
it most, which allows for freedom in production and earning potential.26  Thus, 
under this principle, the producer of a good is given exclusive control and 
property rights in the good, which they can transfer to a person who is willing to 
pay for it.27  This basic principle was undermined in the emergence of streaming 
and downloading technology and illustrates the same economic issues that will 
again arise in the growth of 3D printing.  Much like with Napster, the original 
producer of the good can be easily undercut by a million 3D printed versions and 
recreations of the original.  However, unlike with Napster, a potential benefit 
could be that these newer printed versions might actually be better than the 
originals. 
                                                                                                                   
 22  Id. at 475 (noting lack of control over production). 
 23  Elizabeth J. Kennedy & Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Gearing Up for the Next Industrial Revolution: 
3D Printing, Home-Based Factories, and Modes of Social Control, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 955, 984 (2015). 
 24  Lucas S. Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds of Bits and Atoms, 
51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 558 (2014). 
 25  Deven R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 219, 255. 
 26  Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 917, 945 (2005). 
 27  Id. at 946.  
5
Smith: From IP Goals to 3D Holes: Does Intellectual Property Law Provide
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2017
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 7/29/2018 3:39 PM 
90  J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 25:85 
 
II.  MIND THE GAP: WHERE DOES IP LAW START AND STOP WITH 3D 
PRINTING? 
A.  PRODUCT 
The product printed by a 3D printer is governed by patent law.  Patent law, 
which is a creature exclusive to federal law, governs inventions.28  Accordingly, 
to properly define patents, a fair amount of legalese and statutory language is 
required as well as the respective keywords and phrases found in the leading case 
law.  The patent system was created by Congress to protect inventions “in a 
manner to promote free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering 
future research and discovery,” while also ensuring the eventual public availability 
of inventions.29  Under the current intellectual property framework, two kinds of 
patents are available for an invention that may be 3D printed: design and utility.  
To obtain a utility patent, an invention must be a process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, which is novel, useful, and non-
obvious.30  Patent protection for a utility patent is for twenty years from the date 
the patent is issued.31  “[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, 
or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent” and is subject to 
liability.32  Infringement of a utility patent focuses on the invention itself, 
particularly the function and specification of the product outlined in the patent 
application, as well as the specific claims to the invention awarded by the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office. 
A design patent protects “original and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture.”33  “A design is ornamental if it presents a pleasing, aesthetic 
appearance,” not determined by any functional characteristics.34  “Additionally, a 
design patent must fulfill the statutory requirements of novelty, and non-
obviousness.”35 The patent grants a monopoly as to the claim of the patent for a 
term of fifteen years from the date the patent is granted.36  “[T]he test for design 
patent infringement is not identity, but rather sufficient similarity—whether ‘the 
accused design could not reasonably be viewed as so similar to the claimed design 
that a purchaser familiar with the prior art would’ ”suppose it to be the other.37  
                                                                                                                   
 28  Thomas B. Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality? Twenty Years of Design 
Patent Litigation Since Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 
10 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 195, 197 (1985). 
 29  35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012). 
 30  See 35 U.S.C. § 101-103 (2012) (noting the requirements for obtaining a utility patent). 
 31  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
 32  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 33  See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012). 
 34  Lindgren, supra note 28, at 197–98.  
 35  Id. at 198. 
 36  See 35 U.S.C.A. § 173 (West 2017). 
 37  See Pac. Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d 694, 701 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
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B.  PROCESS  
1.  Patent Law.  There is, however, a gap in protection in the blueprint of the 
3D-printed product.  While protection is available for the product itself under a 
utility patent, and for the look and feel of the design under a design patent, there 
is no protection for the underlying function of a digital model of a 3D blueprint 
in patent law.  Any potential protection for this underlying digital file was 
thwarted under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS 
Bank International, in which the court virtually made software patents ineligible as 
to the statute’s patentable subject matter requirement.38  Under Alice, a software 
patent is deemed an abstract idea, and therefore not patentable, unless it includes 
an “inventive concept,” which requires more than mere implementation on a 
computer (a non-novel technology).39  With software being the digital DNA of 
3D printed objects, this holding will significantly affect patent-holders’ rights 
moving forward.  
2.  Patent Infringement.  Typically, because patent infringement suits can be 
relatively complex and costly, patent holders will pursue an action against the 
manufacturer or distributor of the patent being infringed upon, rather than the 
purchasers of the product themselves.40  These entities make far better fiscal 
targets than the resulting end-users of infringing patents.41  The bank accounts of 
the manufacturers and distributors are typically more substantial and reliable than 
those of individual purchasers, as these manufacturers and distributors are often 
repeat-offenders of patent rights.42  Further, a patent-holder need only procure 
an injunction against these select few defendants to cease the extensive patent 
abuse.  However, in the context of 3D printing, an end-user may download a 
CAD file and never use it, thereby not infringing on the patent.  Patent 
infringement requires the actual use of the article itself, rather than the simple 
downloading of the 3D blueprint.  As such, proving patent infringement would 
require an implausible amount of expensive discovery to be performed on every 
individual end-user.  Ultimately, this would simply prove to be economically 
impracticable and even wasteful as these vast discovery costs would dwarf any 
damages potentially recovered.43  
Further, a company could not be a direct infringer for the sale of a CAD file 
to an end-user wishing to print the object at home.  While an offer for the sale 
presents a distinct basis for finding direct infringement, an offer to sell CAD files 
for a patented product would not be an infringement for the same reasons that a 
                                                                                                                   
 38  134 S. Ct. 2347, 2350 (2014). 
 39  Id. at 2357.  
 40  Robert Maier, Patents In A 3D World: The Challenge of the Second File-Sharing Revolution, INTELL. 
PROP. TODAY (Jan. 6, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/library/document.ashx?g=a058d949-
392c-4290-a9a9-34e7e4d6188b.  
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id.  
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sale of a CAD file is not an infringement.  As explained in Transocean Offshore 
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., “[t]he offer must be for a 
potentially infringing article,” i.e., a tangible object.44  Under these principles, 
selling or offering to sell a CAD file of an object cannot be deemed a sale of the 
patented object itself giving rise to direct infringement liability.45 
Likewise, secondary theories of patent infringement, such as active 
inducement and contributory infringement are unlikely to be successful in a 3D 
printing context.  Active inducement, like contributory infringement, requires 
knowledge that one is infringing or willful blindness to the prospect of 
infringement occurring.46  While this form of infringement does not have the 
strict liability component of direct infringement, it may expand to the more 
egregious distributors of CAD files in disseminating patent infringing products.  
However, it will likely be more difficult to encompass end-users who purchase or 
download the CAD file for infringing products, as consumers are typically less 
knowledgeable about the law.  Further, to prove contributory negligence, 
assuming that the knowledge requirement has been met, this type of infringement 
also requires the making, using, or selling of a component of the infringing 
product, which the Supreme Court does not extend to the software used to enable 
it.47  
3.  Evolution of Software Patent Law.  The answer to this quandary may lie in 
existing case law and the evolution of the Court’s stance on the patentable subject 
matter as we know it today.  In the 1970s, the Supreme Court twice addressed 
whether inventions containing computer software were patentable, both times 
ruling in the negative.  In Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court held that a method for 
converting binary-coded-decimal numerals into pure binary numerals for use 
with general purpose digital computer of any type could not be a patentable 
process as the underlying mathematical formulas were “abstract intellectual 
concepts” and constituted “the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” 
48  The Supreme Court reiterated this holding in Parker v. Flook, on the question 
of whether a claimed method for updating alarm limits in the catalytic converter 
process constituted patentable subject matter.49  The Court held that because a 
mathematical formula was inherent in the patent’s method, it was no less barred 
as unpatentable subject matter merely because it contained post-solution 
activity.50  Specifically, the Court stated that “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the 
                                                                                                                   
 44  617 F.3d 1296, 1300, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
 45  Daniel Harris Brean, Asserting Patents to Combat Infringement Via 3d Printing: It’s No “Use,” 23 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 793 (2013). 
 46  See Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 759 (2011).  
 47  See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 449 (2007) (“Abstract software code is an 
idea without physical embodiment, and as such, it does not match § 271(f)’s categorization: 
‘components’ amenable to ‘combination.’ ” (citing 35 U.S.C.A. § 271)).  
 48  409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 49  437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 50  Id. at 590. 
8
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss1/7
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 7/29/2018 3:39 PM 
2017]   FROM IP GOALS TO 3D HOLES 93 
mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and useful 
structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.”51 
The Supreme Court once again addressed software patents in 1981 in Diamond 
v. Diehr.52  However, interestingly enough, the Court ruled that a process for 
curing synthetic rubber was patentable even though it contained an underlying 
mathematical formula.53  The process in question consisted of constantly 
measuring the temperature inside a rubber mold and feeding the temperature 
measurements into a computer, which repeatedly recalculated the cure time by 
use of the mathematical equation.54  The computer then signaled a device to open 
the press at the proper time.55  The Court reasoned that this case was 
distinguishable from Benson and Flook because it was not the mathematical 
formula being patented, but rather the formula “in conjunction with all of the 
other steps” of the process.56  The Court emphasized that an “application” of a 
mathematical formula to an already known process may very well be patentable 
and deserving of the accompanying protections.57  However, citing Benson and 
Flook, the Court pointed out that an inquiry must always be made as to whether 
a claim seeks to patent a mathematical formula in the abstract, a principle which 
should not be “circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a 
particular technological environment.”58  Though a core principle of patent law, 
this statement made in conjunction with the rest of the Diehr opinion seemed to 
confound more than clarify. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the holding in Diehr generated much confusion for 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, as well as for lower courts on 
how to interpret the holding as to future software patent applications and claims, 
as the majority holding essentially seemed to contradict the core holdings of 
Benson and Flook.59  The lack of clarity as to the future of software patents 
following the majority’s opinion was in fact predicted in Justice Steven’s dissent 
in which he warned that the preceding line of cases did not establish rules 
enabling a “conscientious” patent attorney to determine which program-related 
inventions would be patentable.60  He further expressed concern that the 
majority’s ambiguous focus on the term “algorithm” within the “law of nature”  
                                                                                                                   
 51  Id. at 591 (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 
(1939)).  
 52  450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 53  Id. at 192-93. 
 54  Id. at 178. 
 55  Id. at 179. 
 56  Id. at 187.  
 57  Id.  
 58  Id. at 191.  
 59  Daniel A. Tysver, The History of Software Patents: From Benson, Flook, and Diehr, to Bilski and 
Mayo v. Prometheus, BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/software-patent/history.html (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2016). 
 60  Diamond, 450 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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as a category  of unpatentable subject matter, rather than the terms “mathematical 
formula” and “computer program” as used in preceding cases, could give rise to 
“almost any process [being] so described and therefore held unpatentable.”61  As 
such, it appeared that the only clarity offered by the Court in Diehr was that 
software-related inventions would thereafter be very claim-specific when 
scrutinized as patentable subject matter.   
The Federal Circuit (the highest court for patent matters other than the 
Supreme Court)62 sought to clarify the issue of software patentability in 1994 with 
In re Lowry,63 concerning a patent for a method of organizing stored data in a 
computer memory.64  The patent involved creating data models from “attribute 
data objects” stored in the computer’s memory.65  The claim was originally 
rejected by the United States Patent and Trademark Office as non-statutory 
subject matter.66  The Board of Patent Appeals rejected the examiner’s finding,67 
citing In re Gulack,68 in which the Federal Circuit had previously held that “the 
critical question is whether there exists any new and unobvious functional 
relationship between the printed matter and the substrate.”69  The Federal Circuit 
surmised that the issue essentially came down to a matter of “fram[ing],” and 
determined that the Board incorrectly chose to view the issue as “whether a new, 
nonobvious functional relationship exist[ed] between the printed matter (data 
structure . . . ) and the substrate (memory).”70  In reversing the Board’s holding71 
distinguishing Lowry’s patents from the “printed matter” exception,72 the Court 
held that, unlike the current patent claim, printed matter cases “dealt with claims 
defining as the invention certain novel arrangements of printed lines or 
characters, useful and intelligible only to the human mind.”73  The Court further 
stated that printed matter cases have no relevance where “the invention as 
defined by the claims requires that the information be processed not by the mind 
but by a machine, the computer.”74  Therefore, when the patent concerns data 
structures within a memory that requires processing by a machine, rather than 
the human mind, the claim might be considered patentable subject matter.75  
                                                                                                                   
 61  Id. 
 62  See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). 
 63  32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 64  Id. at 1580. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Id. at 1580, 1582. 
 67  Id. 
 68  703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 69  Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1582 (citing Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1386). 
 70  Id.  
 71  Id. at 1585. 
 72  Id. at 1583.  
 73  Id. (quoting In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (CCPA 1969)). 
 74  Id. 
 75  See id.  
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The Federal Circuit further clarified the patentability of computer software in 
its decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc..76  The 
patent at issue involved a processing system, identified by the trademarked name 
“Hub and Spoke,” which supported a structure “whereby mutual funds (Spokes) 
pool their assets in an investment portfolio (Hub) organized as a partnership.”77  
Essentially, the structure allowed for partnership tax advantages to mutual fund 
administrators while likewise providing them with comparable economies of 
scale.78  Importantly for IP purposes, however, through Hub and Spoke’s 
functionality, dollar amounts were filtered through a series of calculations and a 
final share price resulted.  The Court found this to be “a practical application of 
a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces a useful, 
concrete and tangible result.”79  In recognition of Diehr, the Court noted that an 
invention capable of manipulating numbers would not necessarily be 
nonstatutory subject matter unless “useful, concrete and tangible result[s]” were 
simply not achieved.80  This particular invention did achieve a result of the sort 
and therefore was patentable. 
In the case of In re Comiskey,81 the Federal Circuit reviewed a patent claiming 
a “method and system for mandatory arbitration involving legal documents.”82  
Due to lack of judicial clarity and direction from previous opinions from both 
the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, the PTO pressed the Federal Circuit 
to consider and determine Comiskey on the Section 101 issue because “the Office 
needed guidance in this area.”83  As to the actual invention itself, the USPTO 
further argued that the subject matter at issue, a rather basic six-step method for 
determining when and how arbitrations should be held, was merely an abstract 
idea wholly disconnected from a machine and unable to transform “materials to 
a different state or thing.”84  The Court was forced to reiterate one of the most 
traditional yet elementary patent law concepts that “the application of human 
intelligence to the solution of practical problems is not in and of itself 
patentable.”85  Perhaps due to the previous lack of judicial guidance, the Court 
even reminded that the original standard of the Patent Act of 1793 was still 
“essentially” in effect: “[A]ny new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof] . . . .”86  The 
                                                                                                                   
 76  See 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 77  Id. at 1370. 
 78  Id.  
 79  Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).  
 80  Id. at 1374.  
 81  554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 82  Id. at 970. 
 83  Id. at 973 (citing Appellate Brief at 15). 
 84  Id. (citing Appellate Brief at 12). 
 85  Id. at 980. 
 86  Id. at 977.   
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Court concluded that some of the claims failed to meet this standard.87  
Accordingly, the court remanded to the Patent and Trademark Office to review 
the remaining claims that described the same process but further included some 
type of physical device.88 
A year later, the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Bilski 
v. Kappos,89 where the Court had held unpatentable an invention that assisted in 
hedging risk against market fluctuation.90  In the prior case of In re Bilski,91 the 
Federal Circuit reasoned that the patent did not meet the standards set forth in 
the machine-or-transformation test, which requires that a process is patent 
eligible if: “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms 
a particular article into a different state or thing.”92  However, though the 
Supreme Court concurred with the Federal Circuit’s ultimate holding as to 
patentability, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the 
machine-or-transformation test was the sole test for determining patentable 
subject matter eligibility.93  The Court ultimately rejected the patent in Bilski on 
the grounds that, like Benson and Flook, it similarly attempted to receive a patent 
for an abstract idea.94  Nonetheless, as predominantly adjudged in the patent law 
community, Bilski was considered unhelpful as to determining the boundaries of 
method claims.95 
In 2011, the Federal Circuit held in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.96 
that a credit card internet fraud detection system was unpatentable subject 
matter.97  Specifically, the patent recognized the prior art of traditional credit card 
fraud detection systems, but said that this new system went a step further by 
detecting IP addresses in internet transactions.98  Unconvinced, the Court 
pointed out the logical inference that when the Supreme Court ruled that the 
machine-or-transformation test was not the sole test for determining whether a 
process was patent-eligible, the Federal Circuit was then given the opportunity to 
incorporate other potential tests and criteria it found appropriate.99  The Federal 
Circuit first determined that the patent did not meet the machine-or-
transformation test anyway.  However, in perhaps a small effort to test out the 
                                                                                                                   
 87  Id. at 981.   
 88  Id.  
 89  561 U.S. 593 (2010).  
 90  Id.  
 91  545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 92  Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954. 
 93  561 U.S. at 594.   
 94  561 U.S. at 595. 
 95  Ryan Steidl, Comment, Application of Functional Claiming Limitations: The Practical Effects on 
Software-Related Patents, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 157, 165 (2015).  
 96  654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 97  Id. at 1367. 
 98  Id. at 1370 (citing 561 U.S. at 613). 
 99  Id.   
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new freedom gifted it by the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit further 
determined that the patent was “drawn to an unpatentable mental process”; 
something the Federal Circuit deemed to be a “subcategory [sic] of unpatentable 
abstract ideas.”100  As to the remaining claims involving a computer-readable 
medium, the Court deemed them failed as well, noting that “the machine ‘must 
play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed,’ ” which 
means more than just the incidental use of a computer by a process that may 
purely be performed through mental steps.101  
The next significant step in the Supreme Court’s attempt to clarify a 
determination of patent-eligible subject matter came the next year in Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc..102  The patent at issue concerned 
a process created to determine the rate at which different patients metabolized 
thiopurine drugs to better treat autoimmune diseases.103  Each claim recited (1) 
an administering step (which instructed the doctor to administer the drug), (2) a 
determining step (which instructed the doctor to measure the metabolite levels 
in the patient’s blood), and (3) a wherein step (which would describe the 
concentrations of metabolite levels in the patient’s blood and inform the doctor 
of the dosage most effective for the patient, based on the data).104  In a unanimous 
decision, the Court held that methods for making such determinations were 
already known and well-practiced in the field of medicine, and the activity 
involved in the process did not transform the laws of nature involved into a 
patent-eligible application.105  
The Court relied on its holding in Flook, emphasizing the importance of 
analyzing which steps of a claim are obvious and known in the art, as well as 
determining if the steps combined to transform the process into an inventive 
application.106  The Court ultimately held that similar to the patent in Flook, the 
process’s additional steps in no way limited the claim to a singular application. 
Since the chemical processes were already well-known and used in the medical 
field, the Court reasoned that, if the formula were removed, no “inventive 
concept” would remain.107  The Court appeared to create a two-part test, 
emphasizing that one must first look to whether the patent claims involved speak 
to a patentable-eligible concept, followed by an analysis of whether the claims 
involved add an ‘inventive concept’:  
                                                                                                                   
 100  Id. at 1371.  
 101  Id. at 1375 (quoting SiRF Tech., Inc. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 
2010)).  
 102  566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 103  Id.  
 104  Id. at 1290-91. 
 105  Id. at 1291.  
 106  Id.  
 107  Id. at 1292. 
13
Smith: From IP Goals to 3D Holes: Does Intellectual Property Law Provide
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2017
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 7/29/2018 3:39 PM 
98  J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 25:85 
 
These statements reflect the fact that, even though rewarding with 
patents those who discover new laws of nature and the like might 
well encourage their discovery, those laws and principles, 
considered generally, are “the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.” (citation omitted) And so there is a danger 
that the grant of patents that tie up their use will inhibit future 
innovation premised upon them, a danger that becomes acute 
when a patented process amounts to no more than an instruction 
to apply the natural law, or otherwise forecloses more future 
invention than the underlying discovery could reasonably 
justify.108   
Following this ruling, though the Court relied heavily on Flook, it was unclear 
if the two-part test created in Mayo applied to more than just processes involving 
laws of nature.  After this holding, the Patent and Trademark Office subsequently 
developed its own test for determining subject eligibility for methods that applied 
natural laws, yet computer programs were excluded from the analysis.109 
The Court most recently attempted to clarify this issue in Alice Corp. Proprietary 
Ltd. v. CLS Bank International.110  The Alice patents involved a method for 
mitigating “settlement risk,” in financial exchanges via software.111  Specifically, 
the patents claimed: “(1) a method for exchanging financial obligations, (2) a 
computer system configured to carry out the method for exchanging obligations, 
and (3) a computer-readable medium containing program code for performing 
the method of exchanging obligations.”112  Explicitly adopting Mayo’s two-part 
test, the Court first rejected the claims as abstract, patent-ineligible concepts.113  
Comparing the patent to the risk-hedging claims at issue in Bilski, the Court held 
that “intermediated settlement is [also] ‘a fundamental economic practice long 
                                                                                                                   
 108  Id. at 1301–02 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman 
& R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011) (“[A]rguing that § 101 reflects 
this kind of concern.”); CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 112 (2012) (“ ‘One problem with 
[process] patents is that the more abstractly their claims are stated, the more difficult it is to 
determine precisely what they cover.  They risk being applied to a wide range of situations that were 
not anticipated by the patentee.’ ”); WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305–06 (2003) (“The exclusion from patent law of 
basic truths reflects ‘both . . . the enormous potential for rent seeking that would be created if 
property rights could be obtained in them and . . . the enormous transaction costs that would be 
imposed on would-be users [of those truths].’ ”)). 
 109  Kelly Fermoyle, Adapting Alice: How to Formulate A Repeatable Test Based on Alice v. CLS Bank, 
6 CYBARIS®, AN INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 201, 215–16 (2015) (citing MPEP § 2106.01 (8th ed. Rev. 
9 Aug. 2012)). 
 110  134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 111  Id. at 2349.  
 112  Id.  
 113  Id. at 2350.  
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prevalent in our system of commerce’ . . . .”114  Further, the Court held that the 
third-party intermediary had long been accepted as a “building block of the 
modern economy.”115  
The Court declined to go further in clearly defining what qualifies as an 
“abstract idea,” merely stating that risk hedging is one.116  After including the 
issue of abstractness as part of the two-part test established in Mayo, many hoped 
the Court would clarify the point in Alice.  Rather, the Court simply reverted to 
its habit of judging patents on a case-by-case basis rather than providing a broad 
guidepost for future patent-seekers.117  Nonetheless, in this unanimous opinion, 
the Court strongly reiterated their concern for patents “tying up” underlying 
abstract ideas,118 while also acknowledging that, on some level, “ ‘all 
inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, [and] abstract ideas.’ ”119  Therefore, the Court concluded that it 
must “tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all 
of patent law,”120 and consider “application[s] of such [abstract] concepts to a 
new and useful end” patent eligible.121 
The Court then approached the second step of the test outlined in Mayo: a 
consideration of the “elements of each claim both individually and as ‘an ordered 
combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature 
of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”122  This is commonly known as 
the “inventive concept,” and the Court’s explanation thereof is helpful: “an 
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent 
in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible 
concept] itself.’ ”123  In other words, do the elements of the claims combined 
create something patentable? In analyzing the steps as a whole, the Court rather 
decisively concluded that the computer components, “ ‘ad[d] nothing . . . that is 
not already present when the steps are considered separately’ ”124 and “simply 
recite the concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic 
computer.”125  The Court emphasized that the steps did nothing to add to the 
function of the computer itself or improve any field of technology.126  Rather, the 
                                                                                                                   
 114  Id. at 2356 (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231). 
 115  Id. at 2356. 
 116  Id. at 2357.  
 117  David J. Ball & Douglas F. Stewart, Software Patents Survive Supreme Court’s Alice Decision, but 
Questions Linger, 21 WESTLAW J. INTELL. PROP. 2, 3 (2014). 
 118  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354.  
 119  Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293).  
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67). 
 122  Id. at 2355 (quoting Mayo 132 S. Ct. at 1298).  
 123  Id. (quoting Mayo 132 S. Ct. at 1294). 
 124  Id. at 2351 (quoting Mayo 132 S. Ct. at 1298). 
 125  Id.  
 126  Id.  
15
Smith: From IP Goals to 3D Holes: Does Intellectual Property Law Provide
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2017
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 7/29/2018 3:39 PM 
100  J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 25:85 
 
Court determined that the “instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated 
settlement using some unspecified, generic computer is not ‘enough’ to transform 
the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”127  This is a remarkable stance 
taken by the Court, if only for the fact that Alice, decided in 2014, is now the 
leading case in the area of software and patents and is poised on the periphery of 
the all but certain 3D printing revolution. 
After the decision of the Court in Mayo and Alice, it appears evident there can 
be no patent protection for the underlying CAD file for a 3D printer.  However, 
one exception discussed above was where a patent claim is drafted to the 
underlying computer readable medium as in In re Beauregard.128  Though, as 
previously discussed, Cybersource added significant limitations to the Beauregard 
claim, which could limit the patent of any CAD file given that it is merely a vehicle 
for the underlying invention.129  Therefore, unless the Supreme Court somehow 
dovetails from this line of decisions culminating in Alice, there appears no way 
for the underlying CAD file to receive patent protection.  “Absent a newly 
invented CAD file format or printing method to accompany a newly created 
digital product, there can be no meaningful patent protection secured for a CAD 
file to help combat 3D printing infringement.”130  Though there may be 
protections for the CAD file under copyright law, it too presents its own 
limitations.  
4.  Copyright Law.  Copyright protection is available under the broad category 
of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”131  The reach of copyright protection 
is quite broad, and many of the copyright statute’s definitional terms are 
remarkably close to what a 3D printer does, uses and produces.  As the statute 
explains, PGS works include “two-dimensional and three-dimensional works 
of . . . art . . . and art reproductions . . . diagrams, models, and technical 
drawings.”132  A 3D printer is capable of producing or taking its instructions from 
each of these items (“technical drawings”). 
Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form 
but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a 
useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, 
or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and 
are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.133 
The CAD file or blueprint of the 3D printed product would fall under this 
category.  Further, the 3D-printed product may have copyright protection as a 
                                                                                                                   
 127  Id.   
 128  53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
 129  Brean, supra note 45, at 806. 
 130  Id. at 807. 
 131  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 132  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 133  Id. (emphasis added). 
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sculptural work or as a “useful article,” meaning “an article having an intrinsic 
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or 
to convey information.”134  
Nonetheless, copyright law is not without its limitations and is in some ways 
less powerful than patent law.135  For example, while patent law protects against 
independent creation and reverse engineering, copyright law does not.136  If one 
were to independently generate a blueprint for an item, there could be no 
copyright liability for creating that blueprint, even if it can effectively be used to 
print the same object.  Additionally, there could be a fair-use argument in using 
the blueprint to make a product, which is not available under patent law.137  
Further still, if an end user performs a 3D scan of a patented article and creates 
a new digital blueprint file through that scanning process, the end user would be 
the creator of that file.  Therefore, that person could presumably disseminate it 
without concern for any copyrights held by the original designer and 
manufacturer of the scanned article.  Lastly, although copyright might protect the 
transferring and copying of the blueprint files, it is not sufficient to restrict the 
ultimate printing of the articles themselves.  And, of course, copyright holders 
have faced difficult challenges in enforcing copyrights in the music and media 
context, and these same challenges would apply in this context. 
Copyright is further limited due to matters of originality.138  A basic principle 
of copyright law is that for a work to be copyrightable, it must be original.  As 
the Supreme Court stated in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 
“the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will 
suffice . . . no matter how crude, humble or obvious.”139   As mentioned earlier, 
devices with which one can scan a 3D-printed item to replicate objects currently 
exist and will soon be mass-marketed.  However, under current law, this digital 
scan may not be copyrightable due to lack of originality.  No originality is 
involved in the scan, and the person scanning the 3D object contributes nothing 
to the original digital model, unlike a photograph that incorporates the 
perspective of the photographer.  
For example, in Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., Toyota hired 
Meshwerks to create digital models of its vehicles so that Toyota could essentially 
alter the images of its vehicles digitally rather than conduct a new photoshoot 
every time the company made a slight change to one of the vehicle models. 140  
Meshwerks’s modeling software produced digital imaging of the vehicles, 
                                                                                                                   
 134  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 135  Brean, supra note 45 at 808. 
 136  Id. 
 137  Id.  
 138  Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization 
of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1706 (2014). 
 139  499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 140  528 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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resembling a “wire-frame model”141 based on the vehicles' data points 
(measurements).  The details could then be digitally altered later.  The dispute 
arose when Toyota used the digital images to create multiple advertisements, 
which Meshwerks argued were intended for one-time use only, thereby violating 
Meshwerks’s copyright images of the digital models.142  The Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals concluded that the Meshwerks models depicted the Toyota car exactly 
as the car is, without adding any personal expression to the model that a 
photographer might add, such as lighting, shading, and angle.143  The court 
further stated that, though the copy Meshwerks created was unusual, “[t]he fact 
that a work in one medium has been copied from a work in another medium does 
not render it any the less a ‘copy.’ ”144  However, the court also emphasized that 
digital modeling can be used to create “copyrightable expressions,” under the 
same principles that photographs may be.145  While CAD files are similar to more 
architectural works, they could be construed as factual depictions of the actual 
3D-printed product, without an express statement from the legislature on the 
issue.146 
Another issue surrounding the copyrightable claim to a CAD file lies in the 
merger doctrine. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
explained in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, the merger doctrine occurs 
“when the ‘idea’ and ‘expression’ of a copyright are thus inseparable.” 147  When 
this occurs, “copying the ‘expression’ will not be barred since protecting the 
‘expression’ in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the ‘idea’ upon 
the copyright owner free of the conditions and limitations imposed by the patent 
law.”148  The issue in Herbert was whether the defendants were infringing on the 
plaintiff’s “jeweled bee pins” copyright by also making “jeweled bee pins.”149  The 
court ultimately concluded that a bee pin is an “idea” that the defendants were 
free to copy, as it constituted an area of production that they did not believe 
Congress intended for copyright to monopolize.150  The critical distinction 
between “idea” and “expression” is difficult to draw.  As Judge Hand candidly 
wrote, “Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone 
beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression.’” . . .  At least in 
close cases, one may suspect, the classification the court selects may simply state 
the result reached rather than the reason for it. In our view, the difference is really 
                                                                                                                   
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. at 1261. 
 143  Id. at 1267. 
 144  Id.  
 145  Id. at 1269.  
 146  Nathan Reitinger, CAD's Parallel to Technical Drawings: Copyright in the Fabricated World, 97 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 111, 137 (2015). 
 147  446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 148  Id. 
 149  Id. at 739. 
 150  Id. at 742.  
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one of degree as Judge Hand suggested in his striking “abstraction” formulation 
in Nichols v. Universal Pictures . . . . The guiding consideration in drawing the line is 
the preservation of the balance between competition and protection reflected in 
the patent and copyright laws.151 As more people use scanning technology to 
create their own 3D printable items, this doctrine will undoubtedly need to be 
reanalyzed.152 
C.  IMPORTATION ISSUES: LOST IN TRANSLATION 
Another critical question revolving around the control of 3D printing is 
regulation of the underlying CAD file from importation outside of the United 
States.  This may occur when a competing company attempts to avoid patent law 
infringement by sending a patented invention’s CAD file outside the country in 
order to print the article based on the digital model.  The Federal Circuit recently 
addressed this issue in ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade 
Commission.153  The central issue of this case arose out of a complaint from an 
orthodontic company, Align, which holds patents for orthodontic teeth 
aligners.154  The company uses a digital scan of a patient’s teeth to create a series 
of teeth aligners, which slowly move the teeth to a straight position over a period 
of time, much like braces do.155  ClearCorrect also produces teeth aligners, but in 
an attempt to skirt Align’s patents, the company scans the teeth in the U.S. and 
sends them to Pakistan.156  A company in Pakistan then creates the digital models 
for the aligners and sends them back to the United States to be 3D printed.157  
Align filed a complaint with the United States International Trade 
Commission (ITC), arguing that these digital models constitute an importation 
of “articles,” thereby violating unfair trade practice and antitrust law, and the ITC 
agreed.158  As discussed earlier, digital models themselves do not have patent 
protection as “software” without an “inventive step.”  Therefore, protection 
under the ITC regulation would appear to extend protection to the underlying 
CAD file of a patent.  The U.S. Federal Court of Appeals held that the ITC 
improperly categorized the digital models as “articles” because the agency gave 
“article” a broader meaning than the definitions it actually cited.159 
                                                                                                                   
 151  Id. (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)). 
 152  Desai & Magliocca, supra note 138, at 1709. 
 153  810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 154  Id. at 1287. 
 155  Id. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Id. 
 158  Id. at 1289. 
 159  Id. at 1295. 
19
Smith: From IP Goals to 3D Holes: Does Intellectual Property Law Provide
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2017
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 7/29/2018 3:39 PM 
104  J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 25:85 
 
The court also found that the ITC failed to properly analyze the legislative 
history of the term “article” regarding the Tariff Act.160  The Court found that 
the decision should have been based on the full quote located in a Senate Report, 
which states, “The provision relating to unfair methods of competition in the 
importation of goods is broad enough to prevent every type and form of unfair 
practice and is, therefore, a more adequate protection to American industry than 
any antidumping statute the country ever had.”161  Ultimately, the court found 
that this quote supported that unfair trade and competition law covered the 
importation of goods only, rather than “non-material things,” such as digital 
models.162  It further emphasized that if Congress’s intent differed, it must be 
expressly stated.163  Specifically, the court appeared to not want to expand its 
ruling to affect intellectual property law, stating, “Congress is in a far better 
position to draw the lines that must be drawn if the product of intellectual 
processes rather than manufacturing processes are to be included within the 
statute.”164  While the Court declined to analyze the fate of these CAD files under 
the purview of fair trade law, this case further illuminates the issues that may arise 
about the ownership of 3D printer models, and how they may affect business 
operations in the future.  
III.  SOLUTIONS PROPOSED IN THE WORLD OF IP 
A.  ROLE OF CONGRESS 
There have been numerous articles theorizing how 3D technology might 
affect the current legal framework as the law will play an important role in the 
technology’s success.  Many of these scholars suggest an expansion on the current 
laws surrounding inventions, or at the very least, a clarification on how the 
existing legal framework will affect the new technology.  Professors Deven Desai 
and Gerard Magliocca, for example, urge Congress to establish a regulatory 
scheme that “(1) removes the shadow of infringement liability from some people 
who use 3D printers for personal purposes; and (2) provides clear rules for 
websites that host the programs that let these devices function.”165  Given that 
attempts to establish direct patent infringement for 3D printed products would 
be futile, the authors argue that Congress should remove all doubt of illegality 
associated with 3D printing, as at least a handful of people will likely be targeted 
and forced to pay damages for infringement.166  On the other side of the 
                                                                                                                   
 160  Id. at 1297. 
 161  Id. at 1301 (quoting S. Rep. No. 67-595, at 3 (1922) (emphasis in original)). 
 162  Id. at 1301. 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. at 1302 (quoting Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1376–77). 
 165  Desai & Magliocca, supra note 138, at 1694–95. 
 166  Id. at 1716.  
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spectrum, they see creating a fair use exception or making patent infringement an 
intentional tort as unnecessarily broad.167  One very interesting remedy they 
suggest is raising the amount in controversy for federal jurisdiction over 
infringement claims so as to weed out the commercial infringers from those 
infringing patents for personal use.168  
B.  NAPSTER REBORN? 
Many scholars also propose an extension of the existing Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) to the protection of CAD files, given the ease with which 
websites may merely expand their compliance with current law.169  The DMCA’s 
notice and takedown provisions basically allow copyright holders to stop others 
from distributing their works on the Internet for online service providers (OSPs), 
which may not be aware of infringing distribution on their site.170  This law allows 
OSPs to escape liability for the dissemination of the copyrighted work so long as 
they stop allowing the infringement to take place once notified.171  
Harvard Law school alumnus, Davis Doherty, suggests that an extension of 
this act should be a two-fold process, the goal being to “(1) implement a 
standardized notice-and-takedown procedure for websites such as Thingiverse 
and Shapeways, that grants a safe harbor from liability, so long as the sites did 
not have actual knowledge of infringement; and (2) establish a limited ‘innocent 
independent inventor’ defense that protects DIYers and hosting websites.”172  
Doherty also fully supports an “Inventive Commons,” a non-profit organization, 
which would operate under the United States Patent and Trademark Office.173  
The goal of the organization would be to make sure that all unpatented 
innovations are swiftly recognized and become a part of a patent public 
domain.174 
IV.  POLICY CONCERNS 
This Article has addressed how aspects of 3D printing tend to fall through 
the cracks as well as solutions proposed by others to address these gaps in the 
law.  However, it is important to note that the right answer to the apparent lack 
of law applying to 3D printing may be to do nothing.  It may be that the existing 
regulatory system works well for many aspects of this new technology.  “The 
                                                                                                                   
 167  Id. at 1716–17. 
 168  Id. at 1717.  
 169  Davis Doherty, Downloading Infringement: Patent Law As A Roadblock to the 3D Printing Revolution, 
26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 359 (2012). 
 170  See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 171  Id.  
 172  Doherty, supra note 169, at 365. 
 173  Id. at 372. 
 174  Id. 
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existing set of default laws and mandatory laws permits a large amount of private 
legal ordering.  The paradigmatic private legal ordering mechanism is contract, 
but other mechanisms exist, including simply having no rules or informally 
adopting self-governing rules and norms.”175 
It is evident that the rise of 3D printing has done nothing to stifle 
inventiveness.  In fact, websites such as Thingiverse show that people are willing 
to share their inventive ideas with others for no compensation.  This distinction 
between “inventiveness” and “innovation” may be relevant to Congress when 
deciding whether to expand intellectual property protection in the era of 3D 
printing.176  What about innovation?  The patent system historically enabled 
innovators to succeed through their abilities as entrepreneurs, by allowing them 
to control the licensing and manufacturing of their products.  With 3D printing 
drastically slashing the costs of manufacturing, this trade-off no longer exists.  As 
one Stanford law school professor, Mark Lemley, puts it, “intellectual property 
law is justified only in ensuring that creators are able to charge a sufficiently high 
price to ensure a profit sufficient to recoup their fixed and marginal expense” or 
“only to the extent that that excludability [of the property right] does in fact create 
value.”177  Therefore, it would appear that from an economic standpoint, when 
high manufacturing costs no longer exist, there no longer exists an economic 
justification for patent monopoly.  
In fact, as Lemly outlines, more than there being merely no economic 
justification for broad intellectual property rights, there are actually many costs in 
overcompensating creators.  These costs fall into five categories: intellectual 
property rights distort competitive norms, create static inefficiencies, interfere 
with the ability of others to create work, increase rent-seeking behavior, impose 
great administrative costs, and distorts the general economic equilibrium through 
the overinvestment in research and development.178  However, this is not an 
argument against overhauling intellectual property rights altogether.  Rather, 
Lemly emphasizes that “[g]ranting intellectual property rights imposes a complex 
set of economic costs, and it can be justified only to the extent those rights are 
necessary to provide incentives to create.”179 
Further, property rights that have previously been private access only often 
go through reversals to a more community-based approach depending on the 
costs and benefits.180  Technology has much to do with the threat to privatization 
as is evident with the intellectual commons following Napster peer-sharing.  
                                                                                                                   
 175  Osborn, supra note 24, at 593 (footnote omitted). 
 176  Skyler R. Peacock, Why Manufacturing Matters: 3D Printing, Computer-Aided Designs, and the Rise 
of End-User Patent Infringement, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1956 (2014). 
 177  Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1057 (2005). 
 178  Id. at 1058-1059.  
 179  Id. at 1065.  
 180  Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 424 
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Following Napster, it is clear that “the case for closing access is much stronger 
the more we think it is necessary to encourage innovation and investment.”181  
Following this commons, the extension of copyright extended through the 
DMCA.  Such an extension through patent law would have a much greater effect, 
as patent law already offers stricter protection.  Such an extension of intellectual 
property protection may undermine the primary goals of patent law by stifling 
innovation at too high a cost.  In other words, “[i]f property rights are costly to 
enforce (litigation expenses, social friction) and enforcement is not very effective, 
the legitimacy of the legal rights are undermined.”182 
V.  CONCLUSION  
The revolution of 3D printing is sure to change manufacturing and many 
aspects of current laws.  Like with all technology, the reactions of lawmakers, 
judges, and practitioners will affect whether the technology and its use are 
successful.  Ultimately, 3D printing should be gently regulated as it promotes 
exactly the type of innovation of the arts and sciences that the law aims to bolster.  
The technology allows for creativity at a cheaper cost than has ever before been 
possible.  However, the largest threat to this development is the current ambiguity 
of the law.  Credence must be given to both the costs and benefits of 
strengthening the current intellectual property framework and a balance must be 
reached between rights-holders and other creators.  Yet, one thing is clear.  A 
lesson should be learned from the legal chaos that ensued after the widespread 
infringement that followed from Napster peer-sharing: the law surrounding 3D 
printing should be clarified now. 
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